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Abstract 
 
We find that in a market for a homogeneous good where firms are identical, compete in quantities and 
produce with constant returns, the percentage of wel-fare losses (PWL) is small with as few as five 
competitors for a class of demand functions which includes linear and isoelastic cases. However with 
fixed costs and asymmetric firms PWL can be large. We provide exact formulae of PWL and robust 
constructions of markets were PWL is close to one in these two cases. We show that the market 
structure that maximizes PWL is either monopoly or dominant firm, depending on demand. Finally we 
prove that PWL is minimized when all firms are identical, a clear indication that the assumption of 
identical firms biases the estimation of PWL downwards. 
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1. Introduction
In his classical contribution Cournot (1837, Chapter 8) established that when the num-
ber of rms in a market tends to innity, oligopolistic equilibrium tends to perfect
competition. As a corollary, Welfare Losses (WL), measured as the di¤erence between
social welfare in the optimal and the equilibrium allocation, tend to zero. But, what
happens when the number of rms is nite? Is perfect competition a good approxima-
tion or, on the contrary are WL signicant? (see Hotelling (1938) and Yarrow (1985)
for an early treatment of this problem).
As a rst cut to the problem, assume that all rms are identical and costs and
demand are linear. It is easily calculated that the percentage of WL under Cournot
competition, denoted by PWL, is 1=(1 + n)2 where n is the number of rms. Thus a
market composed by 7 identical rms ("the seven sisters") produces a PWL of 1.56%,
not a big number.1 This poses a serious question: were WL systematically small there
would be little to be gained by considering oligopolistic behavior: A simple equilibrium
concept like perfect competition may be preferable. Moreover, the motivation for public
policies is weakened under small WL. Then, the dilemma is, either we nd environments
in which oligopoly produces WL much greater than those found in the linear model or,
we abandon the oligopoly model as a leading model describing markets.
Let us rst comment on papers that are relevant to our problem. McHardy (2000)
studies a model with quadratic demand and presents numerical calculations. He nds
that WL can be up to 30% larger than those in the linear model, which is encouraging
but still does not solve the problem. Anderson and Renault (2003) calculate PWL under
the assumptions made above except that they assume an inverse demand function of
the form p = A  bx, (x is aggregate output and p market price):2 They do not study
if PWL di¤ers substantially from those in the linear model. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005)
show that if rms are identical, average costs are not increasing and the inverse demand
1This formula shows that once linearity is assumed, as done implicitly by Harberger (1954), WL
seldom goes up to big numbers except if the number of rms is very small. A list of other empirical
papers measuring WL in oligopoly can be found in Tullock (2003) p. 2.
2This form of demand generalizes both linear ( = 1) and isoelastic (with elasticity of demand 1=)
forms and allows for computation of equilibria. See González-Maestre (2000) for an early application.
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function is concave, PWL is bounded above by 1=(2n+ 1), which is still not very large
because a market with seven rms achieves more than 93% of maximum welfare.
Our paper is a quest for markets where oligopoly produces large WL and, thus, it
is a relevant model of market competition. Specically, the purpose of our paper is
twofold.
1: To provide workable formulae for PWL which depend, as far as possible, on
magnitudes that are observable.3 We regard these formulae as the main contribution of
the paper from the point of view of applied economics because they show which variables
to look at when dealing with WL in an actual market.
2: To use these formulae to construct markets where the Cournot equilibria yields
large PWL, sometimes close to one.4 These constructions are the main contribution of
the paper from the theoretical point of view because they show that oligopoly theory is
valid as a general description of markets with the perfectly competitive case as a limit.
In Section 2 we consider the baseline model, which is that of Anderson and Renault.
We might expect that for suitable values of , WL were much higher than those in the
linear case. However, by using numerical methods we nd that the maximum PWL
obtained in this case is not very di¤erent from the one obtained in the linear case.
Moreover, for some values of , PWL is arbitrarily small. Thus, the consideration of a
more general class of demand functions does not bring signicant WL associated with
oligopoly, but on the contrary it adds to the suspicion that WL under oligopoly may be
small. We then turn our attention to xed costs and heterogeneous rms.5.
In Section 3 we consider free entry with a xed (actually sunk) cost. We provide
formulae for the maximal and the minimal PWL where this magnitude depends on the
number of rms and . We show that when  and the xed cost are not observable, for
any exogenously given observation on market price, output, average variable cost and
number of rms, PWL can be chosen arbitrarily (Proposition 1). In particular when 
3The parameter , which can be estimated but not observed, enters in the formula of PWL in
Anderson-Renault (2003), so it is unavoidable in the more general set ups considered in this paper.
4Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005) o¤er an example of a market where PWL is arbitrarily close to one but
in which the inverse demand function is not di¤erentiable.
5Other attempts to nd higher WL focus on issues ouside market competition like X-Ine¢ ciency
(Leibenstein (1966) and Rent-Seeking (Tullock (1967).
3
tends to innite, PWL can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to one. This result implies
that any given price-marginal costs margin, or elasticity of demand, is compatible with
any PWL. When the xed cost can be observed, the observed variables must fulll a
condition which implies that entry is blockaded. We show that any observation fullling
this condition is compatible with many -but not all- PWL (Proposition 2). In this
section WL are due to the combination of the form of the demand function -we show
that PWL with linear demand is large but far from one- and there is overentry -because
the optimal number of rms is one.
In Section 4 we consider heterogeneous rms. We provide a formula for PWL where
this magnitude depends (positively) on the share of the largest rm, (negatively) on
the Hirschman-Herndahl concentration index, denoted by H, and on . We nd that
there are market shares, number of rms and  that yield PWL close to one whereas H
is close to zero (Proposition 3). In particular, the most e¢ cient rm has a market share
of 1   PWL; and there is an innite number of ine¢ cient rms in the market, so all
rms have a negligible market share. We check the robustness of this construction by
considering the e¤ects on PWL when one of the above magnitudes is held xed. In all
cases, PWL is large -not necessarily close to one- and negatively correlated with H.6 All
these results points out that H is not a reliable measure of WL.7 More importantly, they
show that the concept of a "large economy" must be taken with care because seemingly
innocuous departs from the model where all rms are small and identical may have
serious welfare consequences. Next, we prove that the market structure that maximizes
PWL is a dominant rm when  > 0 and monopoly for  < 0 (Proposition 4). This
shows that monopoly, the target of attacks of our profession from Adam Smith on, is
not the worst outcome in terms of WL. Finally we prove that PWL is minimized when
rms are identical (Proposition 5). This shows that proper care of the heterogeneity of
6 In the linear case, H is positively related to PWL but the values of H are not a reliable estimate
of PWL. Thus for n = 5, H = :2, which is a value considered high for some anti-trust authorities but
PWL = 2:7%, not a large number:
7That social welfare is increasing in the marginal cost of small rms was rst pointed out by Lahiri
and Ono (1988). For a criticism of the idea that concentration is generally bad for social welfare see
Daughety (1990) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
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rms is essential to obtain estimates of PWL that are not biased towards small PWL.
Finally, in Section 5 we o¤er some thoughts about our results. Our main conclusion
is twofold. On the one hand, the search for WL in actual markets should focus on
economies of scale and asymmetric rms, two facts that are seldom considered in the
applied literature. On the other hand the oligopoly model is still alive and well as a
leading model in the study of markets. Moreover, in some cases we turn the tables: the
classical vision of markets as places where (large) surplus is created may be too optimistic
and markets may create little or no surplus at all, at least in several relevant cases. Other
important points are the characterization of the best and the worst possible market
structures from the welfare point of view when rms are di¤erent and the construction
of a "large" market where PWL is arbitrarily close to one.8 Moreover, our paper
suggests that, in general, large discrepancies of oligopolistic and perfectly competitive
outcomes may exist but should not be taken for granted.
It goes without saying that important causes of WL are not considered here, i.e.
product di¤erentiation, investment, R&D, location, etc. The analysis of the impact of
these variables on WL requires the consideration of games that are more complicated
than those considered here and, consequently, they are left for future research.
2. The Baseline Model
There is a representative consumer with a utility function U = Ax  bx+1+1   px where
x is aggregate output, p is the market price, b > 0 and  >  1. The maximization of
utility generates an inverse demand function p = A  bx. Notice that if  < 0, b < 0,
and A = 0 we have an isoelastic function p =  bx. The linear case occurs if  = 1.
There are n identical rms each producing a single output denoted by xi, i = 1; :::; n.
Thus x  Pni=1 xi. Marginal cost is constant and denoted by c. Prots for rm i are
i  (p   c)xi. Dening a  A   c we have that i  (a   bx)xi. Assume ab > 0
and  A < cn. These assumptions guarantee that output and price are positive in
equilibrium (see (2.1) below).
8Other points that have already been noticed in the literature are the importance of the functional
form of demand and the failure of H and price-marginal cost margins to capture WL.
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If rms compete à la Cournot, the rst order condition of prot maximization yields
a  bx   bx 1xi = 0. It is easy to check that the second order condition holds and
that equilibrium is symmetric. Thus Cournot equilibrium output and market price are
x = (
an
b(n+ )
)
1
 and p =
A+ cn
n+ 
: (2.1)
Social welfare, denoted by W , is the sum of industry prots and the utility of the
representative consumer, i.e. W = ax   bx+11+ : The optimal aggregate output is found
by maximizing W , namely
xo = (
a
b
)
1
 : (2.2)
Social welfare in equilibrium and in the optimal allocation, are, respectively
W  =
a
+1
 n
1
(n+ + 1)
b
1
 (n+ )
1
 (n+ )(+ 1)
and W o =
a
+1
 
b
1
 (+ 1)
: (2.3)
From (2.3), the percentage of WL denoted by PWL is
PWL  W
o  W 
W o
= 1  n
1
 (n+ + 1)
(n+ )
+1

 L(; n); (2.4)
see Anderson-Renault (2003) p. 262. The following properties of L(; ) are easily proved:
i) limn!1 L(; n) = 0:
ii) lim! 1; L(; n) = 0.
iii) lim!1 L(; n) = 0.
iv) L(; ) decreases with n.
v) L(; n) is quasiconcave in .
i) is the usual property of large economies, as noticed in the Introduction. The
explanation of ii) is that when  !  1, the market produces in the limit an innite
amount of surplus, so the loss caused by oligopoly tends to zero. iii) is caused by the fact
that when  ! 1, inverse demand is at so rms cannot inuence price and optimal
and equilibrium output are identical. ii) and/or iii) imply that there are markets where,
for a given n, PWL is as small as we wish, something that is impossible in the case
of quadratic utility functions. iv) shows that, when there are no technological issues at
stake, the more competition, the better. Finally v) follows from the fact that Anderson
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and Renault (2003) proved that W o=W  is quasi-concave on . So W =W o is quasi-
convex and  W =W o is quasi-concave, so it is 1 W =W o.
We now study PWL as a function of , see Figure 1. Notice that v) guarantees that
the local maximum found there is a global maximum.9
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FIGURE 1: PWL for n = 1 (black), 2 (red), 3 (light red), 4 (green) and 5 (brown).
Table 1 below shows the maximum PWL, denoted by PWL, and the corresponding
values in the linear model, denoted by PWLL, for selected values of n. Notice that iv)
above guarantees that for n larger than 10, PWL will be smaller than 2.2%.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
PWL :27 :118 :076 :058 :044 :0357 :032 :027 :024 :022
PWLL :25 :11 :0625 :04 :027 :02 :0156 :012 :01 :008
TABLE 1
9Figure 1 suggests that the  that maximizes L(; n) increases with n.
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Notice that the relative di¤erence between PWL and PWLL increases with n (from
8% for n = 1 to 175% for n = 10). However this e¤ect is not strong enough to obtain
signicant WL in the cases in which the linear model yields small WL. Given this and
that PWL can be much smaller than PWL, we conclude that the consideration of a
more general class of utility functions alone is not helpful to nding signicant WL.
3. Fixed Costs and Free Entry
In this section we assume that in order to produce, rms must incur in a xed cost,
denoted by k, and that there is an innite number of potential rms. The number
of active rms in equilibrium is denoted by n. Given n, output is determined as in
the previous section. We assume that the decision of entry is prior to the decision on
output.10 Thus, equilibrium under free entry implies that if n rms are in the market,
rm n has non negative prots but rm (n+ 1) has non positive prots, formally
a
1+
 n
1 

b
1
 (n+ )
1+

 k  a
1+
 (n+ 1)
1 

b
1
 (n+ + 1)
1+

: (3.1)
Welfare in a Cournot equilibrium with free entry is
W  =
a
+1
 n
1
(n+ + 1)
b
1
 (n+ )
1
 (n+ )(+ 1)
  nk; (3.2)
where n solves (3.1). In an optimal allocation, aggregate output equals the one in (2.2).
Thus, social welfare in the optimal allocation with one active rm is
W o =
a
+1

b
1
 (+ 1)
  k: (3.3)
Assuming a
+1
 > kb
1
 (+ 1), i.e. that the xed cost is small enough, one active rm
is socially optimum because it yields more social welfare than no rms and economies
10Thus the xed cost is actually sunk. Lopez-Cuñat (1999) has shown that, under conditions that are
met here, the equlibrium considered in this paper is a subset of an equilibrium when both decisions are
simultaneous (like in Novshek [1980] and Ushio [1983]). Thus this cost can also be considered as xed.
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of scale imply that is optimal to produce xo in one rm. Thus PWL can be written as
PWL =
a
+1
 
b
1
 (+1)
  a
+1
 n
1
 (n++1)
b
1
 (n+)
1+
 (+1)
+ (n  1)k
a
+1
 
b
1
 (+1)
  k
: (3.4)
In order to have a formula, in which PWL depends on observable variables, we substitute
k for its upper and lower bounds in (3.1). It is clear that PWL is increasing on k. Thus,
the maximal PWL, denoted by MA(; n), occurs for the maximum value of k, namely
MA(; n)  (n+ )
1+
   n 1 (n+ + 1) + (n  1)n 1  (+ 1)
(n+ )
1+
   n 1  (+ 1)
: (3.5)
Minimal PWL, denoted by MI(; n), occurs for the minimum value of k, namely
MI(; n) 
(n+ + 1)
1+
   n
1
 (n++1)
1+2

(n+)
1+

+ (n  1)(n+ 1) 1  (+ 1)
(n+ + 1)
1+
   (n+ 1) 1  (+ 1)
: (3.6)
Figures 2 and 3 below picture MA(; n) and MI(; n) for selected values of n.
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FIGURE 2: MA(; 1) and MI(; 1) (black) and MA(; 10) and MI(; 10) (red)
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FIGURE 3: MA(; 2) and MI(; 2) (black) and MA(; 20) and MI(; 20) (green).
We now state the properties of MA(; ) and MI(; ) that correspond to i)-iv) in the
previous section.
i) limn!1MI(; n) = limn!1MA(; n) = 0:
ii) lim! 1MI(; n) = lim! 1MA(; n) = 0:
iii) lim!1MI(; n) = n 1n , lim!1MA(; n) = 1:
iv) Neither MI(; ) nor MA(; ) are monotonic on n:
i) implies that limk!0 PWL = 0, since (3.1) implies that when k ! 0, n ! 1.
Variations of this result have been obtained by Dasgupta and Ushio (1981), Fraysse
and Moreaux (1981) and Guesnerie and Hart (1985). i) and ii) are identical to i)
and ii) in the previous section. However iii) is very di¤erent from iii) because it says
that markets with very large 0s could be very ine¢ cient. For large values of , the
contrast between monopoly and markets with a large number of rms is striking: In the
former it is possible to construct examples where PWL is arbitrarily small and in the
latter such examples are not possible. This is due to the fact that when n is very large,
there are large WL due to the discrepancy between n and the optimal number of rms,
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namely one. Finally iv) is proved in Figures 2 and 3. The reason for this -apparently
paradoxical- result is that k changes in order to maintain the free entry condition (3.1).
We now show that, if k and  are unknown, PWL is arbitrary even if certain
variables -like price, output, marginal cost and number of rms- can be observed and
we require that they correspond to the values in a Cournot Equilibrium with free entry
for some parameters dening demand and costs. To formalize this, we say that aMarket
is a list of real numbers (A; c; b; ; k) such that k > 0, (A   c) > 0,  >  1, b > 0,
 A < cn and (A  c)+1 > kb 1 (+ 1). An Observation is a list (p; xi; c; n) where p
is market price, xi is output of rm i, c (< p) is the marginal cost and n is the number
of active rms. The last variable is a positive integer and the others are positive real
numbers. Under constant returns, the marginal cost equals the average variable cost so
it can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Now we have the following:
Proposition 1. Given an observation (p; xi; c; n), and a number v such that v =MA(^; n);
^ 2 ( 1; 0)[(0;1), there is a market (A^; c; b^; ^; k^) such that (p; xi; n) is a Cournot equi-
librium with free entry for this market (i.e. they fulll (2.1) and (3.1)), and PWL = v.
Proof: For k equal to the maximum value in (3.1), PWL is given by (3.5). Let v
and ^ be such that MA(^; n) = v. Now set
A^ =
p(n+ ^)  cn
^
; k^ =
^(A^  c) 1+^^ n 1 ^^
b^
1
^ (n+ ^)
1+^
^
; b^ =
(A^  c)n
n^x^i (n+ ^)
This system can be solved easily because the rst equation determines A^, the last equa-
tion determines b^ and with these values of A^ and b^ the remaining equation determines
k^. By construction A^^ = p(n + ^)   cn, so (A^   c)^ = p(n + ^)   c(n+ ^) > 0:
Then, from the last equation ^b^ > 0 and the remaining equation implies k^ > 0. Also
A^^ + cn = p(n + ^) > 0. Finally we will show that ^(A^   c) ^+1^ > k^b^ 1^ (^ + 1). Given
the denitions of the parameters, this inequality reads (n + ^)
1+^
^   n 1 ^^ (^ + 1) > 0.
Call 	(^; n) the left hand side of the previous inequality and extend the function to
allow n to take real values. Notice that 	(^; 1) = (^ + 1)((^ + 1)
1
^   1) > 0: Also
limn!1	(^; n) =1. Then, if 	(^; n)  0 there must be a value of n; say n for which
@	(^;n)
@n = 0 and 	(^; n)  0. The former is equivalent to (n + ^)
1
^ n = n
1 ^
^ (1   ^).
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If ^ = 1 this is impossible. If ^ 6= 1 plugging this equation in the denition of 	(; )
we obtain 	(^; n) = (n + ^)
1
^
^
1 ^( ^ + 1   2n) 6= 0. Thus 	(^; n) < 0 , ^ 2 (0; 1).
However for ^ 2 (0; 1), (n+ ^) 1+^^  n 1+^^ so 	(^; n)  n 1^ (n  1+^n )  n
1
^ (n  2n) > 0.
Thus, 	(^; n) > 0.
Plugging the values of A^ and b^ into (2.1) we obtain
x = (
(A^  c)n
b^(n+ ^)
)
1
^ = nxi and p
 =
A^^+ cn
n+ ^
= p:
From the rst inequality in (3.1) (with equality) and the denition of k^ it follows that
^(A^  c) 1+^^ n 1 ^^
b^
1
^ (n+ ^)
1+^
^
=
^(A^  c) 1+^^ n 1 ^^
b^
1
^ (n+ ^)
1+^
^
, n
1 ^
^
(n+ ^)
1+^
^
=
n
1 ^
^
(n+ ^)
1+^
^
;
which has n = n as a solution so the proof is complete.
There are two main implications of this result. On the one hand it points out the
necessity of a good estimate of  in order to judge the e¢ ciency of a market. Notice
that rst order conditions of prot maximization imply that the elasticity of demand
equals n(p c)p so neither the elasticity of demand, nor price-marginal costs margins are
related to  and/or PWL. On the other hand, together with the second part of iii),
it allows for markets yielding PWL arbitrarily close to one, the main theoretical goal
of this paper. The explanation of this, is that we have constructed a market in which,
in equilibrium, prots are zero and, when  tends to innite, consumer surplus is also
zero since from (2.1) we have that
U =

(+ 1)b
1

(
na
n+ 
)
1+
 , so lim
!1

(+ 1)b
1

(
na
n+ 
)
1+
 = 0:
The intuition of the latter equation is that large values of  make inverse demand atter
and atter so consumer surplus goes to zero when  goes to innite. The di¤erence with
iii) in the previous section -where lim!1 L(; n) = 0- arises from the fact that in the
latter industry prots are not zero, but when  tends to innite they tend to a.
We now consider the case where xed costs are observable. In this case an observa-
tion is a list (p; xi; c; n; k) such that k  xi (p  c) (i.e. prots are non negative). Consider
the following condition that guarantees that no rm will like to enter:
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Denition 1. Observation (p; xi; c; n; k) and  fulll condition BE (Blockaded Entry) if
(
n+ + 1
n+ 
)
1+
 (
n
n+ 1
)
1 
 >
xi(p  c)
k
:
The right hand side can be interpreted as the rate of (gross) prots. BE just says
that the rate of prots cannot be larger than a certain number which depends on 
and n. The condition is more illuminating in several special cases. For instance if
 ! 1 condition BE reads k(n + 1) > nxi (p  c). When  !  1 condition BE reads
k (n+ 1)2 > n2xi (p  c). Finally when  = 1, BE reads, k (n+ 2)2 > (n+ 1)2xi (p  c).
Proposition 2. Given an observation (p; xi; c; n; k) and a number v such that v =
MI(^; n); ^ 2 ( 1; 0) [ (0;1), if BE holds, there is a market (A^; c; b^; ^; k^) such that
(p; xi; n) is a Cournot equilibrium with free entry for this market (i.e. they fulll (2.1)
and (3.1)), and PWL  v.
Proof: (Virtually identical to the proof of Proposition 1) For k equal to the mini-
mum value in (3.1), PWL is given by (3.6). Choose ^ such that v =MI(^; n). Set
A^ =
p(n+ ^)  cn
^
; b^ =
(A^  c)n
n^x^i (n+ ^)
This system can be solved, as we showed before. Plugging these values of A^ and b^ into
(2.1) we obtain the required values of x and p. Finally, the left hand side of the free
entry condition (3.1) holds by the denition of an observation. Notice that the right
hand side of (3.1) when we plug the values of A^ and b^ obtained above reads
k  xi(p  c)(n+ ^)
1+^
^ (n+1n )
1 ^
^
(n+ ^+ 1)
1+^
^
;
which under BE holds. When the above equation holds with equality, PWL =MI(^; n) =
v, so PWL  v:
Comparing these with the results obtained in the previous section we see that the
consideration of xed costs allows the possibility of nding large PWL. This is because
13
in this case, we add the misallocation due to the wrong number of rms to the misallo-
cation due to the wrong output.11 The latter comes up to very large numbers because
in our model the optimal number of rms is one.12 But preferences play a role too. In
the linear case, the corresponding expressions to (3.5) and (3.6) are (see Figure 4).
MA(1; n) =
2n  1
n2 + 2n  1 and MI(1; n) =
2n3 + 3n2 + 2n+ 2
(n+ 1)2 (n2 + 4n+ 2)
:
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FIGURE 4: MA(1; n) (black) and MI(1; n) (red)
Even though for large values of n PWL is substantial (i.e. for n = 15; the minimum
PWL is 10:14% which is just below the PWL in the case of no free entry with two
rms), both MA(1; n) and MI(1; n) tend to zero as n ! 1, which was not the case
when  was allowed to vary. Moreover, in this case, values of PWL arbitrarily close to
11Very similar conclusions are drawn if the cost function is cxi+x2i d=2 with d < 0, i.e. under increasing
returns to scale ( 2c(d+b) >  da is required for costs to be positive in the optimum and in equilibrium).
In this case PWL can be very large too because there are too many rms in equilibrium.
12Overentry may also occur even if the marginal cost is increasing, see von Weizsäcker (1980), Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).
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one cannot be obtained for a given n. The reason is that the utility of the representative
consumer when  = 1 is always positive.
4. Non Identical Firms
Suppose now that rms have di¤erent productivities. Let ci be the marginal cost of rm
i. Without loss of generality let c1  ci for all i. Let ai  A  ci. We will assume that
for all i, (n+   1)ai >
P
j 6=i aj , b
Pn
j=1 aj > 0 and  A <
Pn
i=1 ci. This assumption
guarantees that, in equilibrium, all rms produce a positive output and market price is
positive (see Equation (4.1) below). Cournot equilibrium is easily shown to be unique
and given by
xi =
1

(
Pn
j=1 aj
b(n+ )
)
1
 (
ai(n+ )Pn
j=1 aj
  1); x = (
Pn
j=1 aj
b(n+ )
)
1
 and p =
A+
Pn
i=1 ci
n+ 
:
(4.1)
Social welfare is now W = Ax  bx+1+1  
Pn
i=1 cixi =
Pn
i=1 aixi  bx
+1
+1 : In the Cournot
equilibrium
W  =
1

nX
i=1
ai(
Pn
j=1 aj
b(n+ )
)
1
 (
ai(n+ )Pn
j=1 aj
  1)  b
+ 1
(
Pn
i=1 ai
b(n+ )
)
+1
 ; (4.2)
which when all ais are identical reduces to (2.3). In the optimal allocation only the
technology in the hands of Firm 1 is used and accordingly
xo = (
a1
b
)
+1
 and W o =
a
+1

1
(+ 1)b
1

: (4.3)
In order to have a workable expression for PWL that depends on observable variables
alone, let us dene si as the market share of rm i. Clearly,
Pn
i=1 si = 1 and s1  si,
i = 2; :::; n. Then, from (4.1),
si  xi
x
=
ai(n+ ) 
Pn
j=1 aj

Pn
j=1 aj
) ai =
(si + 1)
Pn
j=1 aj
n+ 
: (4.4)
For future reference, we will say that a list of market shares (s1; s2; :::; sn) is a Market
Structure. It is clear from (4.4) that any vector (a1; a2; :::; an) yields a unique market
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structure compatible with Cournot equilibrium and that given a market structure we can
construct a vector (a1; a2; :::; an) (in fact an innite number of vectors) whose Cournot
equilibrium yields this market structure. Given this equivalence, we will focus in this
section on market structure that has the advantage of being observable.
Plugging the last part of (4.4) into (4.2) and after lengthy calculations we obtain
PWL as a function of  and the market structure, namely
PWL =
(1 + s1)
+1
   (+ 1)Pni=1 s2i   1
(1 + s1)
+1

 P (s1;
nX
i=1
s2i ; ): (4.5)
When all rms are identical, (4.5) reduces to (2.4). It is noteworthy that PWL here
depends only on three variables:
- .
- The market share of the largest rm s1.
- The Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration denoted by H Pni=1 s2i .13
Equation (4.5) allows computation of PWL from s1 and H assuming that demand
is linear or isoelastic (where  is the inverse elasticity of demand). It also allows to plot
PWL as a function of  for actual market structures and see what this function looks
like. For instance, the numbers below represent shares of di¤erent rms in the Spanish
gasoline market. Our data do not include operators with less than .013 of market share,
but the consideration of these operators would hardly make any di¤erence in H.
:41 :178 :074 :048 :034 :026 :023 :014
TABLE 2
This market has been voiced repeatedly as not very competitive. In this case, (4.5)
reads like follows:
PWL =
(1 + :41)
+1
   (+ 1):2093  1
(1 + :41)
+1

:
13 In fact, s1 and H are not independent but we prefer to write (4.5) in this way to highlight the role
of H in the formula.
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Looking at Figure 5 it is clear that, except for very special values of , PWL is large.
Indeed for values of  larger than  :6, PWL is larger than 10%. When demand is
concave (  1), PWL is always larger than 28%.
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FIGURE 5
Notice the following properties of P ( ) as dened by (4.5):14
i) lim! 1 P (s1;H; ) = 0.
ii) lim!1 P (s1;H; ) = 1s1
 
s1  
Pn
i=1 s
2
i

:
iii) P (;H; ) is increasing on s1.
iv) P (s1; ; ) is decreasing on H.
v) lim!0 PWL(s1;H; ) = e
s1 1 H
es1 .
i) is identical to i). When rms are identical ii) reduces to ii).15 Point iii) agrees
with the received wisdom: the larger the dominant rm, the closer to monopoly, and
hence the larger the PWL is. However, iv) is counterintuitive because it says the larger
the concentration, the lower the WL. The reason is that when H increases, production
14As we mentioned before we take s1 and H as independent when in fact they are not.
15 If PWL is written as a function of a0is, i) holds and ii) reads lim!1 PWL = 1 
Pn
i=1
a2i
a1
Pn
j=1 aj
.
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is shifted to the less e¢ cient rms which causes social welfare to fall. Finally v) allows
us to extend P (s1;H; ) to  = 0 preserving continuity.
We now discuss why the approach followed in the previous section will not work here.
An Observation is a list (p; x1; :::; xn; c1; :::; cn) where p is market price and xi and ci(< p)
are the output and the marginal cost of rm i and a Market is a list (A; c1; :::; cn; b; )
such that (n +    1)ai >
P
j 6=i aj ,  >  1, b
Pn
j=1 aj > 0 and  A <
Pn
i=1 ci. It is
clear that not all observations are compatible with the model. In particular, the number
of variables in an observation is 2n+1 and the number of parameters dening a market
is n+ 3: With n > 2, the number of parameters will be, in general, unable to generate
the required observations. Also, rst order conditions of prot maximization imply that
xi
xj
=
p  ci
p  cj
that may fail even for the case n = 2. Given this, we will study how PWL depends on
; n and the market structure focussing our attention on limiting cases, i.e. when PWL
is maximal or minimal. Our rst result is that when , n and the market structure can
be chosen simultaneously, PWL can be arbitrarily close to one and at the same time
the concentration index H arbitrarily low.
Proposition 3. There exists (; n; s1; :::; sn) for which PWL is arbitrarily close to one
and H is arbitrarily close to zero.
Proof: From iv) the maximal PWL occurs when s2 = s3 =; :::;= sn. Denoting
these shares by y, we have that s1 + (n  1)y = 1. Plugging this in (4.5) we have that
P (s1; n; ) 
(1 + s1)
+1
   (+ 1)(s21 + (1 s1)
2
n 1 )  1
(1 + s1)
+1

: (4.6)
PWL is increasing on n so the maximum PWL obtains when n is arbitrarily large, i.e.
lim
n!1P (s1; n; ) =
(1 + s1)
+1
   (+ 1)s21   1
(1 + s1)
+1

: (4.7)
We easily compute lim!1 limn!1 P (s1; n; ) = limn!1 lim!1 P (s1; n; ) = 1  s1:
Thus when  and n are very large and s1 very small, PWL is arbitrarily close to one
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(since limits are interchangeable our procedure is robust). The restriction s1  si,
i = 2; :::; n when rms 2; :::; n are identical, is equivalent to ns1  1: This inequality
holds when the order of magnitude at which n tends to 1 is larger than the order of
magnitude at which s1 tends to 0:
Finally, it can be easily shown that when rms 2 to n are identical,
H =
ns21 + 1  2s1
n  1 =
s21 +
1
n   2 s1n
1  1n
;
which when n!1 and s1 ! 0 tend to zero.
We now perform a robustness test on the previous result by checking what would
happen to PWL and H if one of the variables in our construction is held xed.
For given s1, PWL = 1   s1 which for sensible values of s1 might be large. Also,
H = s21: Thus PWL = 1 
p
H so H and PWL are negatively related.
For given n, PWL can be written as in (4.6) above. Taking limits,
lim
!1
(1 + s1)
+1
   (+ 1)(s21 + (1 s1)
2
n 1 )  1
(1 + s1)
+1

=
s1n  s21n  1 + s1
s1n  s1 :
This expression achieves a maximum at
p
n 1p
n+1
when s1 = 1pn : PWL is large -the mini-
mum value of PWL is 0:17- but not close to one: Also H = 2(
p
n 1)p
n(n 1) which is decreasing
in n, see Figure 6. So in this case H and PWL go in opposite directions when n varies.
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FIGURE 6: PWL (black) and H (red) for given values of n.
Finally, if  were given, for n =1,
PWL = 1  (+ 1)s
2
1 + 1
(1 + s1)
+1

:
First order condition of PWL maximization implies s21(1 2) 2s1(1+)+1+ = 0.
If  = 1, the maximum is achieved at s1 = 12 and PWL =
1
3 . If  6= 1 we have
two solutions, s1 =
 1p
 1 . The root
 1 p
 1 can be discarded because if  > 1 it
is negative, if  < 1 it is larger than one and if  2 ( 1; 0) it is not dened. If
 2 (0;1);  1+
p

 1 2 [0; 1] and since it can be easily shown that the maximum is
interior, s1 =
 1+p
 1 maximizes PWL. The latter can be written as
PWL = 1 
1
( 1)2 (+ 1) (
p
  1)2 + 1

 1 (
p
  1) + 1
 1

(+1)
for  2 (0;1);
which increases with , see Figure 7.16 Again, PWL is large but not close to one. In
16Notice that lim!1 PWL = 13 and lim!1
 1p
 1 =
1
2
which equal the values obtained when  = 1.
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this case H = ( 1+
p

 1 )
2 so H and PWL go in opposite directions with respect to :
For  2 (0; 1) the maximum is obtained when s1 = 1, i.e. monopoly.
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FIGURE 7: PWL (black) and H (red) for given values of 
Summing up, in the three cases considered, PWL is easily made large, but not close
to one and H is far from being a reliable measure of PWL.
We now perform a more demanding exercise where PWL is studied by varying only
either the market structure or .
We rst concentrate on how market shares a¤ect PWL. A market structure such
that s1 > s2 =; :::;= sn > 0 will be called a Dominant Firm. A limit case of a dominant
rm is Monopoly where only s1 is positive.
Proposition 4. For  > 0; PWL is maximized when the market structure is a domi-
nant rm with s1 = n+32n+2 if  = 1 and s1 =
 n 1+p1+n+2n+n2
n n if  6= 1: For  < 0
the market structure that maximizes PWL is monopoly.
Proof: The maximum of PWL in (4.5) over
Pn
i=1 si = 1 exists (by Weierestrass
theorem). As mentioned before, it occurs when s2 = s3 =; :::;= sn. So, let us consider
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PWL as given by (4.6). The extrema of this expression with respect to s1 can be
located, either when @P (s1;n;)@s1 = 0 or in the bounds of the interval in which s1 must lie,
namely sj  s1  1 for all j > 1. Since (n   1)sj  s1 the previous inequality can be
written as 1n  s1  1. Now, rewrite (4.6) as follows:
P (s1; n; ) = 1  (+ 1)(ns
2
1   2s1 + 1) + n  1
(n  1)(1 + s1)+1
:
@P (s1; n; )
@s1
=
s21(n  n2)  s1(2 + 2n+ 2+ 2n) + 2 + (3 + n+ ) + n
(n  1) (s1 + 1)
1

+2
(4.8)
@P (s1; n; )
@s1
= 0, s21(n  n2) = 2s1(1 + n+ + n)  2  (3 + n+ )  n(4.9)
We have three possible cases: If  = 1, the solution to (4.9) is s1 =
n+3
2n+2 2 [ 1n ; n]: Then,
the maximum must be located either at s1 = 1n , at s1 = 1 or at s1 =
n+3
2n+2 . We easily
compute,
P (1; n; 1) =
1
4
, P (
1
n
; n; 1) =
1
(n+ 1)2
, P (
n+ 3
2n+ 2
; n; 1) =
n+ 1
3n+ 5
:
From these expressions we obtain the desired result.
If  > 1 from the rst order condition we obtain two solutions,
s1 =
 n  1p1 + n+ 2n+ n2
n  n : (4.10)
Clearly only the solution with a plus sign in front of the square root is feasible. We will
show that for this solution, s1 2 [ 1n ; 1]: If 1n > s1 we would have 2(n  1)+n2(  1) 
n + 1 < 0 which is impossible because the left hand side achieves a minimum when
n = 2 and  = 1. Similarly, if s1 > 1, n    n+ 1 < 0, which again is impossible.17
Finally, notice that since there is only one value of s1 for which
@P (s1;n;)
@s1
= 0 the
shape of P (; n; ) is determined by the sign of @P (s1;n;)@s1 at s1 = 1n and s1 = 1. From
(4.8),
sign
@P ( 1n ; n; )
@s1
= sign(n+ + n  1
n
+ 2   2
n
  1
n
2) (4.11)
17Notice that when ! 1 both the numerator and the denominator in the denition of s1 go to zero.
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which is positive because the expression on the right hand side is increasing in  and
for  =  1 equals to zero. Also from (4.8) we obtain that
sign
@P (1; n; )
@s1
= sign(  n+ 2   n2) = sign((1 + )(1  n)) (4.12)
which is negative so the interior solution is indeed a maximum.
Finally let us consider the case  < 1. Suppose that the negative root in (4.10) is
less than one. Then
 n  1 p1 + n+ 2n+ n2
n  n < 1 ,  
p
1 + n+ 2n+ n2 > n+ 1;
which is impossible. So there is, at most, one interior solution. Suppose rst that  > 0.
From (4.11-12) we get that sign
@P ( 1
n
;n;)
@s1
is positive and sign@P (1;n;)@s1 is negative which
implies that maximum PWL is achieved at the interior solution. If  = 0 the positive
root in (4.10) equals one. Finally, if  < 0, from (4.11-12), we have that sign
@P ( 1
n
;n;)
@s1
and sign@P (1;n;)@s1 are both positive which given that there is, at most one value of s1 for
which sign@P (;n;)@s1 switches from positive to negative means that P (; n; ) is increasing,
so it achieves the maximum when s1 = 1.
Proposition 4 says that the most deleterious market structure is not always monopoly,
the target of the wrath of economists since Adam Smith. In many cases a dominant
rm structure is worse because rms other than 1 do not add much competition to the
market and they are technologically ine¢ cient. We notice that under maximal PWL,
H =
ns21 + 1  2s1
n  1 and PWL =
(1 + s1)
+1
   (+ 1)(ns21 + (1 s1)
2
n 1 )  1
(1 + s1)
+1

;
so H decreases with n but PWL increases with n. And H increases with s1 but PWL
not necessarily so. Thus, again, the concentration index H is a poor measure of WL.
The maximum PWL for given n and  is obtained by plugging the value of s1 that
maximizes PWL as found in Proposition 4 and denoted by s(; n), into P (s1; n; ).18
18Properties of s(; n) when  > 0 are: ) limn!1 s(; n) = 1p+1 . ) lim!1 s(; n) =
1p
n
: )
@s(;n)
@
> 0, 3n+ n+n2 + n2   2 < 2p(1 + n+ 2n+ n2)(n+ 1) and ) s(; ) is increasing in
n , (n+ 2n  2p(1 + n+ 2n+ n2) + 2)(1  ) > 0:
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Let P (s(; n); n; )  F (; n), say. Figure 8 shows F (; n) for several values of n and
for  2 (0; 50]. For  2 ( 1; 0) maximal PWL is obtained under monopoly. This is
why all the curves in the gure tend to the same value when  ! 0, namely to PWL
under monopoly, which by v) above is e 2e = 0:264; see also Figure 1 above.
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FIGURE 8: F (; n) for n = 2 (red), 3 (light red), 4 (green), 5 (brown) and 10 (black).
Now we state and prove some useful properties of F (; ):
I) s1(; n) and F (; n) are continuous in :
Proof: Clearly, each of the di¤erent pieces that dene s1(; n) are continuous so we
have only to check continuity at  = 0; 1. First, when ! 0,  n 1+
p
1+n+2n+n2
n n ! 1.
The continuity of s1(; n) at  = 1 can be shown by multiplying the numerator and the
denominator of  n 1+
p
1+n+2n+n2
n n by  n   1  
p
1 + n+ 2n+ n2:19 Finally,
continuity of F (; n) follows from the continuity of s(; n) and P (s1; n; )
II) F (; ) is increasing in n.
19This is a general method to show that solutions of a quadratic equation ax2 + bx + c = 0 are
continuous in a when a! 0.
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Proof: Extend the functions P (s1; ; ) and F (; ) to have real values in the domain.
It is clear that such functions are di¤erentiable in n. Now compute,
@F (; n)
@n
=
dP (s(; n); n; )
dn
=
@P (s1; n; )
@s1
@s1
@n
+
@P (s1; n; )
@n
=
@P (s1; n; )
@n
;
where the last equality comes from the fact that s(; n) maximizes PWL with respect
to s1 (this is the envelope theorem). Finally, it was established in Proposition 3 that
P (s1; ; ) is increasing in n so the desired result follows.
This result implies that, for any number of rms, it is possible to nd the PWL
of, at least, the magnitude of F (; 2) which for values of  2 (0; 50] never goes below
0:209 7. Finally, we state two limiting properties of F (; ) :
III) lim!1 F (; n) =
(
p
n)
3
+
p
n 2n
(
p
n)
3 pn :
IV ) limn!1 F (; n) = 1  (
p
 1)2(+1)+( 1)2
( 1) 1 (p 1)
+1

:
Notice that in both cases PWL is high even for small values of  and n; see Figure
9. It is clear that limn!1;!1 F (; n) = lim!1;n!1 F (; n) = 1: The previous
properties have two interesting consequences.
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FIGURE 9: LIM!1PWL (black) and LIMn!1PWL (green).
Corollary 1. 1: Any PWL 2 (0; (
p
n)
3
+
p
n 2n
(
p
n)
3 pn ) can be obtained for some value of .
2: PWL is obtainable for some value of n i¤ PWL 2 (0; 1  (
p
 1)2(+1)+( 1)2
( 1) 1 (p 1)
+1

):
The rst part of the Corollary follows from I) and III) and the second part from
II) and IV ). We now turn to the study of the market structure that minimizes PWL.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (s^1; s^2; ::::; s^n) minimizes P (s1;
Pn
i=1 s
2
i ; ). Then @ s^i; s^j ;
j > 1 such that s^1 > s^i  s^j > 0.
Proof: Increasing s^i by an small amount, say dx, and decreasing s^j by dx too is
feasible -i.e. s^i + dx and s^j   dx 2 [0; s1]; increases H and so decreases PWL which
contradicts that PWL is minimized.
Lemma 1 implies that only three market structures might minimize PWL.
1: All rms produce the same output: Market structure is ( 1n ;
1
n ; :::;
1
n):
2: All rms minus one, say n, produce the same output. Market structure is
(x; x; :::; y) with x > y.
3: A number of rms, say 1; :::;m with m < n produce the same output, and the
remaining rms produce zero output. Market structure is ( 1m ; :::;
1
m ; 0; :::; 0).
But option 3) cannot minimize PWL since it was established that when all rms
are identical, PWL decreases with the number of (active) rms (Property iv) in Section
2). So we are left with options 1 and 2.
Proposition 5. The market structure that minimizes PWL is when all rms produce
the same output.
Proof: Notice that market structures 1 and 2 can be written as (x; x; :::; 1 (n 1)x)
with x 2 [ 1n 1 ; 1n ], where the lower bound of this interval comes from 1  (n   1)x. In
this case H = (n  1)x2 + (1  (n  1)x)2: Plugging H into (4.5) we obtain
PWL = 1 
(+ 1)

(n  1)x2 + (1  (n  1)x)2

+ 1
(1 + x)
+1

 PW (; x; n):
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Now, computing @PW (;x;n)@x this expression is found to be equal to
  (1 + )
(1 + x)
1+

[2n2x  2nx  2n+ 2 
(1 + )

(n  1)x2 + (1  (n  1)x)2

+ 1
1 + x
]
Solving for @PW (;x;n)@x = 0 we obtain the following. If  = 1,
@PW (; x; n)
@x
= 0, 4n+ 4x+ 2  4n2x = 0, x = 2n+ 1
2n2   2 <
1
n  1 :
So only boundary solutions are feasible and PWL is minimized when x = 1n : If  6= 1,
@PW (; x; n)
@x
= 0, x =  n
2 + 1pn4 + 1 + 2n3 + 2n2   3n2   2n  2n3 + n
(  1)(n2   n) :
Suppose that  > 1. Clearly, the negative root is not feasible, so consider the
positive root, say x. If x  1n , it must be that (n  1)(2 +n  1  n)  0 which for
n > 2 and  > 1 is impossible.
Suppose that  < 1. If the negative root is less than or equal to 1n , we have
that
 
p
n4 + 1 + 2n3 + 2n2   3n2   2n  2n3 + n  (n+ )(n  1)
which is impossible. Take the positive root. If this root is larger than or equal to 1n 1 ,
then n(1 )  2  3+2 or n  2 3+21  . The right hand side of this inequality has
a maximum at 3 when  !  1: Since this value of  is never actually achieved, this
inequality only may hold when n = 2. But @PW (;0:5;2)@x =
0:5+1: 5
0:5+1 > 0 which means
that the minimum is achieved at the boundaries of x. Since in this case these bounds
imply monopoly and duopoly, by iv) in Section 2 we achieve the desired result.
The implication of this result is that disregarding rms heterogeneity stacks the
deck in favour of small WL because the assumption that all rms are identical implies
that PWL is minimal among all market structures. Thus, minimal PWL is given by
the function L(; ) in (2.4). Notice that since L(; ) is decreasing in n and F (; ) is
increasing in n, the di¤erence between maximal and minimal PWL increases with n for
a given , see Figure 10. Figure 10 also suggests that for a given n  5, the distance
between these two magnitudes increases with . Finally, since P (; n; ) is continuous
in s1, any PWL between L(; n) and F (; n) is reachable by the choice of s1:
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FIGURE 10: Maximal and Minimal PWL for n = 2 (black), 5 (red) and 10 (green).
Finally we consider the e¤ect of  alone on PWL. We have little to say about the
value of  that maximizes PWL because rst order condition of maximization with
respect to  is not very informative.20 However, the continuity of P (s1; n; ) has an
interesting implication. Let V  maxf s1 Hs1 ;
(1+s1)2 2H 1
(1+s1)2
; e
s1 1 H
es1 g. The values in the
bracket are respectively, P (s1; n; 0); P (s1; n; 1) and lim!1 P (s1; n; ): Then, we have:
Corollary 2. Any PWL 2 (0; V ) is obtainable by the choice of :
5. Final Comments
When one observes public policies on oligopolies one sees some concern about the num-
ber and the relative size of rms. But the question of the output set by oligopolists
is cause of little or no concern at all. This paper provides some justication to this
attitude: We found that WL due to the divergence between equilibrium and optimal
output are small, even with as few as four rms in the market as shown in Section 2. On
20 @P (s1;n;)
@
= 0,  n  2s1 +   2s1 + ns21 + ns21 1 ln (s1+ 1) = n  2s1 + ns21.
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the contrary WL due to the number and relative size of rms can be quite substantive
as found in Sections 3 and 4. This conclusion, though, is likely to be exaggerated by
our assumption that the optimal number of rms is one. Other factor that may bring
down WL is the consideration of other solution concepts, e.g. Bertrand or Stackelberg
equilibria, the latter particularly suited to the case of a dominant rm. However, in a
dynamic framework WL can be larger than here because rms may collude. Thus, our
results are just a rst cut to the problem.
Our results have a number of implications for the applied literature.
1: To measure WL due to oligopolistic output setting is misguided because these
are likely to be small. However WL due to overentry or to asymmetric rms can be
substantial. Lack of consideration of these points biases downwards our estimates of
WL.
2: Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) found markets where, as the number of rms in-
creased beyond three, the competitive e¤ect of additional rms on average markups
was exhausted, a fact that suggests that the outcome is very close to perfect competi-
tion. A possible explanation for their ndings is that they considered markets where
asymmetries and economies of scale were possibly small such as doctors, dentists, drug-
gists, plumbers and tire dealers. In contrast, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2002) nd that
this competitive e¤ect persists with a large number of rms in markets were rms are
asymmetric and the product is di¤erentiated.
3: The impact of mergers and collusive agreements on social welfare depends on
the characteristics of the market. For instance, with identical rms and no xed costs
our results in Section 2 suggest that anti-trust authorities should not be very concerned
with mergers that do not bring the number of competing rms below, say four. However
merging from duopoly to monopoly approximately doubles PWL.
4: WL depend on the parameter  that cannot be observed, but can be estimated.
Our results point out the importance of the estimation of  for the proper account of
WL.
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